Can a transfer of wealth from the US to developing countries be Pareto improving? We analyze this question in an open-economy innovation-driven growth model, in which the highincome (low-income) country produces innovative (homogenous) goods. We find that wealth redistribution to the low-income country simultaneously reduces global inequality and stimulates innovation through an increase in labor supply in the high-income country. Given that the market equilibrium is usually inefficient due to R&D externalities, the wealth redistribution may lead to a Pareto improvement, which occurs if the discount rate is sufficiently low or R&D productivity is sufficiently high.
To require the President to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to further the United States foreign policy objective of promoting the reduction of global poverty, the elimination of extreme global poverty, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal of reducing by one-half the proportion of people worldwide, between 1990 and 2015, who live on less than $1 per day.
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Introduction
A recent report by the World Bank shows that about 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty as of 2005. 1 The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$1.25 per day meaning that the victims of extreme poverty are often unable to meet basic needs for food, water, shelter, sanitation, and health care. 2 Some economists have proposed increasing anti-poverty aid from developed countries to reduce global poverty. For example, Sachs (2005) urges developed countries, such as the US, to set aside 0.7 percent of the gross national product for global poverty reduction. However, critiques are sometimes outraged by the potential tax burden on the citizens. 3 The purpose of this study is to show that this kind of global wealth redistribution may be Pareto improving through innovation and economic growth.
This paper develops an open-economy innovation-driven growth model to analyze the
effects of cross-country wealth redistribution on innovation, economic growth and global welfare.
Specifically, we extend the canonical quality-ladder model into a two-country setting. The highincome country (e.g. the US) produces innovative goods while the low-income country produces homogenous goods. Within this framework, a transfer of wealth to the low-income country stimulates innovation through an increase in labor supply in the high-income country. Intuitively, the wealth transfer increases the marginal utility of wealth of households in the high-income country and hence reduces their consumption of leisure. Therefore, when the high-income country owns a major share of wealth in the world, redistribution can simultaneously reduce global wealth inequality and increase growth through elastic labor supply. Given that the market equilibrium of R&D-based growth models is usually inefficient due to R&D externalities, the redistribution may improve both countries' welfare. We show that a Pareto improvement occurs if the discount rate is sufficiently low or R&D productivity is sufficiently high.
This type of international transfers is an important issue in international economics, and previous studies (to be discussed below) mostly focus on its welfare effects through trade. While the static trade effects are undoubtably important and have received careful analysis, the present study highlights the importance of a dynamic welfare effect of international transfers through growth. For this purpose, it is necessary to consider a growth-theoretic framework. Furthermore, the US is one of the countries at the world technology frontier so that innovation is arguably the most important channel to achieve sustainable growth. Therefore, we consider a model in which growth is driven by innovation. Also, there is supportive empirical evidence for a negative relationship between wealth and labor supply, which is the key mechanism behind the results of the present study.
4
This paper also relates to the issue of R&D underinvestment. Empirical studies often find that the social return to R&D is much higher than the private return. 5 Williams (1998, 2000) apply these empirical estimates to an R&D-based growth model and find that the socially optimal level of R&D is at least two to four times higher than the market level. Therefore, overcoming this market failure of R&D underinvestment would stimulate innovation, increase R&D towards the social optimum and achieve a higher level of social welfare. Featuring this 4 See, for example, Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) for a useful summary of empirical studies that find a negative relationship between wealth and labor supply. They also emphasize the importance of elastic labor supply on income inequality in the AK growth model, but wealth redistribution does not affect growth in their model. 5 See Griliches (1992) for a review on this literature.
prominent market distortion, the R&D-based growth model with elastic labor supply is a suitable framework for analyzing the distortion-correcting effect of international transfers.
In the static literature on international transfers, it is well-known since Samuelson (1947) that if there is no distortion and the equilibrium is stable, then the donating (aid-receiving) country must be worse off (better off). In the presence of distortions, Bhagwati et al. (1983) and others show that the donating (aid-receiving) country may become better off (worse off), and this phenomenon is known as the transfer paradox. Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) consider a multilateral transfer and show that a Pareto improvement may occur but only if tariff distortions exist. The present study relates to these seminal studies by considering R&D underinvestment as a dynamic distortion that is inherent in the US economy and can be corrected by international transfers. In an overlapping generations (OLG) model, Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) show that the transfer paradox may occur due to the finite planning horizon of agents. 6 Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) and Shimomura (2007) also consider Pareto-improving foreign aid in a dynamic North-South model. The present study differs from these dynamic studies by analyzing the roles of endogenous innovation and R&D underinvestment on Pareto-improving transfers.
This paper also relates to the literature on inequality and growth. 7 The early studies of this literature focus on the effects of inequality on physical and human capital accumulation. For example, Bertola (1993) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) find that when inequality leads to redistribution through some political mechanism, the higher tax on capital income is detrimental to growth. In contrast, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) find that in the presence of credit constraints, redistribution may stimulate capital accumulation. In a model in which growth is initially driven by physical capital and subsequently 6 Cremers and Sen (2008) take into account transition dynamics and show that the possibility of a transfer paradox in the OLG model is robust. 7 See Bertola et al. (2006) for an excellent textbook treatment of this literature.
-4 -by human capital, Galor and Moav (2004) show that inequality increases (decreases) growth in the early (later) stages of development. While these studies focus on the effects of inequality on capital accumulation, the present study is related to a more recent sub-literature that analyzes the effects of inequality on innovation-driven growth. In this literature, the different channels through which inequality affects growth can be broadly assigned to two categories (a) supply of factor inputs for R&D and (b) demand for innovative goods (to be discussed below). Although the present study considers a two-country model, the global economy can also be viewed as a single country and the two countries can be relabeled as two types of households, who supply different labor inputs and own different shares of national wealth. In this case, redistribution across countries is isomorphic to redistribution across households. Chou and Talmain (1996) develop a variety-expanding model with elastic labor supply and show that if and only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption differs from unity, wealth redistribution across households would affect growth through aggregate labor supply. While Chou and Talmain (1996) provide an early and interesting analysis on the effects of wealth redistribution on innovation-driven growth and social welfare, they point out that the growth rate and labor supply become non-stationary in their model under a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption. In other words, wealth redistribution having an effect on growth is incompatible with balanced growth in the Chou-Talmain model. The present study continues to analyze the role of elastic labor supply on inequality and growth but allows for different types of labor based on the common perception that it is the supply of high-skill labor that contributes to growth. In this more realistic framework, redistribution affects growth under the conventional unit elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) also explore the relationship between redistribution and growth through the supply of factor inputs for R&D. In particular, they analyze the effect of risk aversion on occupational choice. Their idea is that R&D entrepreneurship is a risky career; thus, the insurance effect of redistribution increases growth by providing more incentives for riskaverse agents to become R&D entrepreneurs. Our study complements Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) by analyzing a related effect of redistribution on the supply of R&D labor.
While the above studies consider the effects of inequality on innovation-driven growth through the supply side, some studies analyze the demand side by allowing for non-homothetic preferences, e.g. indivisible consumption in Li (1998) and hierarchical preferences in Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) . 8 Zweimuller (2000) considers the market effect of inequality (i.e. increasing inequality slows down the growth of market demand for innovative goods) and finds that wealth redistribution from wealthy to poor households increases growth. In contrast, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) consider both the market effect and the price effect (i.e.
increasing inequality allows the innovative goods to be sold at a higher price) and find that the price effect dominates the market effect such that wealth redistribution from poor to wealthy households increases growth. While the demand-side result from Zweimuller (2000) is consistent with the supply-side results from Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) and the present study, the result from Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) is not. Therefore, it becomes an empirical question as to which effect dominates in reality. The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and derives the dynamic properties of the balanced-growth path (BGP)
8 Some recent studies, such as Hatipoglu (2008) and Kiedaisch (2008) , analyze the effects of patent protection on inequality and growth within this growth-theoretic framework of non-homothetic preferences. 9 See Barro (2000) for a review on empirical studies that find different results on the growth-inequality relationship, and Barro also finds that the effects of inequality on growth are different across samples of countries.
and the distribution of wealth across countries. Section 4 analyzes the effects of redistribution on innovation, growth and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The underlying quality-ladder model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991a) . 10 We extend the Grossman-Helpman model into a simple asymmetric two-country setting, in which the highincome country produces innovative goods (e.g. skill-intensive manufacturing products) and the low-income country produces homogenous goods (e.g. agricultural products). This simple setup captures the reality that the level of skill and human capital in the US is higher than in the aidreceiving least developed countries. Also, we allow the two countries to own different shares of global wealth. As for the dynamics, we firstly show that the Euler equation implies a stationary distribution of consumption across countries. Then, given this stationary distribution of consumption, the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique and stable BGP. Finally, this balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy implies a stationary distribution of wealth across countries. Given that the quality-ladder growth model has been well-studied, the familiar components of the model will be briefly described while the new features will be described in more details.
Households
There are two countries indexed by a superscript } , { l h j ∈ . Country h is the high-income country, and country l is the low-income country. There is a unit continuum of representative households in each country. Households in country j have a lifetime utility function given by Each household is endowed with one unit of time to allocate between leisure and labor supply.
The households maximize utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
W is the wage rate in country j. j t V is the value of assets owned by households in country j. For simplicity, we assume a global financial market so that the nominal rate of return t R is equalized across the two countries. t P is the price of consumption goods that are tradable across countries subject to zero transportation cost. The households' consumption-leisure tradeoff is
From the households' intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
is the real interest rate, and
that consumption growth is the same across the two countries.
Consumption and final goods
Consumption goods are produced by aggregating final goods from the two countries, and this sector is characterized by perfect competition. 12 The production function is
The more general iso-elastic utility function given by
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and input prices as given.
Intermediate goods
Country h produces a unit continuum of non-tradable intermediate goods indexed by ]
Each industry is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest invention and dominates the market until the next invention occurs. The production function is 
R&D
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as ) ( i V t . Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification in (5), the amount of profits is the same across industries (i.e.
). As a result,
. Inventions are the only assets in the model. Therefore, the aggregate value of inventions equals the global value of assets owned by all households (i.e.
The familiar no-arbitrage condition for t V is (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (9) equals the sum of (a) the profit t Li (2001) considers a CES production function. In this case, the monopolistic markup can be determined by either the quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending on whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic. This condition determines the allocation of workers between production and R&D in country h.
Decentralized equilibrium
In this section, we define the equilibrium and show that the economy is on a unique and stable BGP. The equilibrium is a sequence of prices Lemma 2 shows that a constant t Ω implies a constant invention arrival rate t λ . As a result, the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor is stationary and aggregate technology grows at a constant rate. The aggregate production function is
where aggregate technology can be re-expressed as
The second equality in (15) uses the law of large numbers. Differentiating the log of (15) 14 In summary, the wealth distribution is stationary and equal to its initial distribution.
Effects of wealth redistribution on growth and welfare
In this section, we firstly derive the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor. 15 Then, we examine the effects of wealth redistribution implemented by a lump-sum transfer. , we impose a lower bound on R&D productivity.
Condition R (R&D productivity):
14 This value will be derived in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A. 15 The proof of Lemma 4 also provides the equilibrium allocations of other key variables. 16 Financing the transfer through distortionary taxes would naturally lead to additional negative effects that reduce the parameter space for Pareto improvements.
The properties of equilibrium R&D labor are quite intuitive. An increase in either the markup z or R&D productivity ϕ improves the incentives for R&D and hence increases R&D labor. A larger discount rate decreases the present value of an invention and the incentives for R&D. As leisure becomes more important (i.e. a larger φ ), labor supply decreases; as a result, R&D labor also decreases. Finally, a larger wealth share of country h reduces its households' marginal utility of wealth and their labor supply; consequently, R&D labor decreases.
Proposition 1: A decrease in the wealth share of country h stimulates innovation and growth.
Proof: See (16) We next examine the effects of global wealth redistribution on welfare. Specifically, we would like to know whether a decrease in the wealth share of country h can increase its households' welfare. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy, (1) simplifies to
. Substituting these conditions into (20) and dropping the exogenous 0 Z yield Differentiating (21) . In this case, country h surprisingly benefits from giving away some of their 17 The signs of these derivatives will be derived in the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.
-16 -wealth to country l because the equilibrium growth rate is inefficiently low. As for country l, Proposition 3 shows that if country h benefits from transferring some of their wealth to country l, then country l must also benefit from this transfer. Proof: See Appendix A.■
In the proof of Lemma 5, we also compare (19) and (23) 
Conclusion
Although this study analyzes global wealth redistribution through the effects on innovation in the donating country, anti-poverty aid also carries other benefits, such as building up productive public infrastructure, for the aid-receiving countries. 18 Even focusing on the innovation effect in the donating country, this study suggests that international transfers can increase innovation and growth, reduce inequality and possibly lead to a Pareto improvement. Therefore, critiques of anti-poverty aid may want to take into account these benefits for the US.
To derive closed-form solutions, we have kept the model simple and tractable. For example, we consider an exogenous trade pattern (i.e. the high-income country produces innovative goods while the low-income country produces homogenous goods) in order to highlight the effects of innovation in the high-income country. Furthermore, this simplification allows the open-economy model with two countries to be viewed as a closed-economy model with two types of households, so that the redistribution effects are readily comparable with the inequality-innovation literature that is based on a closed-economy setting. Also, the present study assumes that the aid-receiving country produces non-innovative goods without the possibility of imitation, technology transfer through multinational firms, and domestic innovation. This setup reflects the reality of providing anti-poverty aid to the least developed countries that have limited capacity to engage in the kind of (a) imitative R&D analyzed in Grossman and Helpman (1991b) , (b) adaptive R&D for technology transfer analyzed in Dinopoulous and Segerstrom (2009) and (c) innovative R&D analyzed in Grossman and Lai (2004) . Finally, the issue of scale effects is set aside by normalizing the supply of labor in the high-income country to unity so that it is the 18 See, for example, Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) for recent studies on this issue.
share of labor devoted to R&D that determines growth as in the second-generation R&D-based endogenous-growth model. . Using these conditions, we can derive that 
